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INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Court is an Article I court.1 It resolves more than 95% of all 
tax-related litigation2—actually nearly 97% of the total federal tax docket 
in 2012.3 Despite this substantial role in federal litigation, scholars and 
courts have generally put aside the issue of what standard is appropriate 
when a U.S. federal court of appeals reviews Tax Court procedural 
questions. Section 7482 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) grants 
jurisdiction to the courts of appeals to review Tax Court decisions “in the 
same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in 
civil actions tried without a jury.”4 Unlike district courts, which must 
follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), the Tax Court 
operates under its own separate set of procedural rules—the Tax Court 
Rules of Practice and Procedure (Tax Court Rules). Congress explicitly 
authorized the Tax Court to choose its own procedural rules under I.R.C. 
§ 7453.5  
Where there is no applicable Tax Court procedural rule, Tax Court 
Rule 1(b) provides that the Tax Court “may prescribe the procedure, 
giving particular weight to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the 
extent that they are suitably adaptable to govern the matter at hand.”6 
Currently, no judicial decision analyzes the appropriate standard for 
appellate review of a Tax Court’s decision to apply (or not apply) a 
federal procedural rule where the Tax Court lacks its own applicable 
procedure.  
The appropriate standard of appellate review for Tax Court procedural 
decisions garnered attention when the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) 
recently sought to intervene in several Tax Court proceedings under 
FRCP 24(a)(2).7 The Tax Court Rules lack an intervention procedure and 
the Tax Court, acting pursuant to its discretion under Rule 1(b), has never 
granted a third party non-taxpayer’s motion to intervene under FRCP 
24(a)(2).8 Given the outcome-determinative potential of the standard of 
                                                                                                                     
 1. I.R.C. § 7441 (2012) (establishing, “under [A]rticle I of the Constitution of the United 
States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax Court.”). In 1924, Congress created 
the Tax Court’s predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals, as an independent agency of the executive 
branch. David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 17, 22. In 1969, Congress established the Tax Court as a specialized legislative court under 
Article I of the Constitution. Id. 
 2. Laro, supra note 1, at 18. 
 3. Leandra Lederman, (Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835, 
1836 n.1 (2014). 
 4. I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1). 
 5. I.R.C. § 7453. 
 6. TAX CT. R. 1(b). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See Appleton v. Comm’r (Appleton I), 135 T.C. 461, 466 (2010). 
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review,9 these recent USVI cases—discussed individually below—
provide an important opportunity to determine whether the abuse of 
discretion or de novo standard should govern appellate review of Tax 
Court procedural decisions. 
In 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit became 
the third federal appellate court to overturn a Tax Court decision denying 
a motion by the USVI to intervene in a dispute between the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) and a taxpayer. In Huff v. Commissioner,10 the 
Eleventh Circuit joined the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and 
Eighth Circuits in allowing the USVI to intervene in a Tax Court 
proceeding.11 However, not all federal appellate courts have ruled this 
way. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit created a circuit 
split when it affirmed the Tax Court in denying intervention to the 
USVI.12  
The Huff decision deepened the current circuit split and complicated 
the matter further. The Eleventh Circuit in Huff—unlike the other three 
circuits that have addressed this issue—allowed intervention as a matter 
of right under FRCP 24(a)(2).13 This approach is novel, as the Tax Court 
has never allowed a third party non-taxpayer to intervene under this 
provision—although it has the discretion to do so under Tax Court Rule 
1(b).14 
The Huff decision presents two issues worthy of discussion in this 
Comment. The first is whether de novo review is appropriate when a 
court of appeals reviews Tax Court procedural decisions. Generally, 
under I.R.C. § 7482, the appeals courts review Tax Court decisions “in 
the same manner and to the same extent” as district court decisions.15 Yet, 
given the Tax Court’s general power to prescribe its own procedural rules 
                                                                                                                     
 9. One study found that “deferential standards of review make reversals less likely relative 
to other outcomes.” Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An 
Empirical Study, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1, 24, 25 (examining case law, determining affirmation and 
reversal rates, and documenting the standard of review applied in those cases); see also Stephen 
E. Ludovici, Rule 60(b)(4): When the Courts of Limited Jurisdiction Yield to Finality, 66 FLA. L. 
REV. 881, 898 (2014) (noting that an abuse of discretion standard provides an “insulating level of 
discretion” to protect lower court judgements). 
 10. 743 F.3d 790 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 11. Id. at 792; Appleton v. Comm’r, 430 F. App’x 135, 136 (3d Cir. 2011); Coffey v. 
Comm’r, 663 F.3d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 12. McHenry v. Comm’r, 677 F.3d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 13. Huff, 743 F.3d at 801. 
 14. Id.  
 15. I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1) (2012); see Lederman, supra note 3, at 1838 (examining whether 
“the courts of appeals treat Tax Court decisions the same as those of district courts in tax cases—
reviewing legal questions de novo and factual questions under a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard—or 
[whether] they [should] apply a more deferential standard analogous to review of agency 
decisions”). 
3
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under I.R.C. § 7453,16 the Huff court erred in applying the de novo 
standard of review to the Tax Court’s decision to not apply FRCP 
24(a)(2).  
The second issue the Huff opinion presents—regarding the substance 
of the case—is whether the USVI has a right to intervene under FRCP 
24(a)(2). This issue turns on whether a Tax Court proceeding is the proper 
forum in which to confront the weighty concerns of fair implementation 
and coordination of two separate but interrelated taxing agencies—the 
IRS and the USVI’s Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).  
Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the pertinent facts of Huff. 
Part II surveys the current circuit split on intervention in Tax Court 
proceedings. Part III analyzes the proper standard for review of the 
USVI’s motion to intervene under FRCP 24(a)(2), as well as the proper 
standard regarding all appellate review of Tax Court procedural 
decisions—a discussion that is largely absent from both scholarly works 
and court opinions. This Comment concludes in Part III with a critique of 
the Huff court’s FRCP 24(a)(2) analysis.  
I.  HUFF V. COMMISSIONER 
The facts in Huff are similar to those of the other cases on both sides 
of the circuit split: (1) a taxpayer filed returns with the BIR pursuant to 
I.R.C. § 932; (2) more than three years after the filing, the IRS issued a 
notice of deficiency in which it challenged the taxpayer’s status as a bona 
fide USVI resident; (3) the taxpayer challenged the notice in Tax Court 
as time barred under I.R.C. § 6501; and (4) the USVI filed a motion to 
intervene in the proceeding.  
In Huff, the taxpayers, claiming to be USVI residents, filed their tax 
returns with the BIR for tax years 2002–2004.17 Under I.R.C. § 932, bona 
fide residents of the USVI do not have to file returns with the IRS or pay 
income taxes to the United States as long as they file returns with the BIR 
and properly report their worldwide income.18 In 2009 and 2010, the IRS 
issued the taxpayers notices of deficiency, claiming the taxpayers were 
not residents of the USVI during the years in question and therefore 
should have filed returns with the IRS and paid taxes on their U.S. source 
income.19 The IRS further claimed that I.R.C. § 6501’s three-year statute 
of limitations period for collections efforts had not begun because the 
                                                                                                                     
 16. The I.R.C. provides that “the proceedings of the Tax Court and its divisions shall be 
conducted in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure (other than rules of evidence) 
as the Tax Court may prescribe.” I.R.C. § 7453. 
 17. Huff, 743 F.3d at 793. 
 18. See I.R.C. § 932(c). 
 19. Huff, 743 F.3d at 793. 
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taxpayers never filed returns with the IRS.20 The taxpayers then filed 
petitions with the Tax Court and argued that the notices were time barred 
(and, in the alternative, incorrect), and the USVI moved to intervene.21 
The Tax Court denied the motion for intervention, and the USVI appealed 
to the Eleventh Circuit.22 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: REVIEWING THE VIRGIN ISLANDS’ 
FRCP 24 MOTIONS 
The Third, Eighth, and, most recently, the Eleventh Circuit Courts of 
Appeals have all reversed the Tax Court and allowed the USVI to 
intervene. The Fourth Circuit stands alone in affirming the Tax Court’s 
denial of the USVI’s motion to intervene. As discussed below, these 
courts have taken different routes in reaching their decisions. As a result 
of this split, the USVI’s right to intervene may simply depend on the 
region in which the taxpayer is located.  
A.  The Underlying Tax Court Decision 
The Tax Court first addressed the issue of the USVI’s intervention in 
a deficiency proceeding in Appleton v. Commissioner (Appleton I).23 Like 
in Huff, the taxpayer in Appleton I claimed the gross income exclusion 
under § I.R.C. 932(c) and thereby filed and paid taxes only to the BIR.24 
The IRS then issued notices of deficiency asserting that the taxpayer was 
not a bona fide USVI resident and therefore did not qualify for the gross 
income exclusion under I.R.C. § 932.25 The taxpayer challenged these 
notices by filing a petition with the Tax Court arguing that I.R.C. § 6501’s 
three-year statute of limitations barred any IRS deficiency claim.26  
The USVI filed a motion to intervene in order to raise the same statute 
of limitations issue under I.R.C. § 6501.27 Although the taxpayer and 
USVI’s legal positions were aligned, the USVI sought intervention “for 
the purpose of protecting its rights and interests,” claiming the IRS’s 
position “threaten[ed] [its] taxing autonomy and fiscal sovereignty and 
significantly impair[ed] the BIR’s ability to administer the tax law of the 
Virgin Islands.”28 Accordingly, the USVI moved to intervene under 
                                                                                                                     
 20. Id. Under I.R.C. § 6501, the IRS generally has three years from the date of filing to 
assess additional taxes owed. I.R.C. § 6501(a). 
 21. Huff, 743 F.3d at 794. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 135 T.C. 461 (2010). 
 24. Id. at 462, 464. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 465. 
 27. Id. at 465–66. 
 28. Id. at 465. 
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FRCP 24(a)(2) (Intervention of Right) and FRCP 24(b)(2) (Permissive 
Intervention).29  
The Tax Court denied both intervention of right and permissive 
intervention.30 Regarding intervention of right, the Tax Court reasoned 
that the USVI’s purely economic interest in the outcome of the 
litigation—avoiding the purported negative effects on the USVI’s 
business climate by the IRS’s collection activities—did not meet “the 
direct, substantial, and legally protectable requirements” that FRCP 
24(a)(2) demands.31 Furthermore, the Tax Court determined that the 
IRS’s efforts would “not undermine [the USVI’s] taxing authority or 
discourage legitimate economic development.”32  
The Tax Court side-stepped the issue of whether FRCP 24(a)(2) may 
be invoked in Tax Court proceedings by stating that “[b]ecause we find 
that movant has not satisfied the requirements of [FRCP] 24(a)(2), we 
need not and do not decide herein whether [FRCP] 24(a)(2) applies to 
proceedings in this court.”33  
The Tax Court denied permissive intervention under FRCP 24(b)(2) 
because the USVI had “neither demonstrated that its participation as a 
party is necessary to advocate for an unaddressed issue nor shown that its 
intervention will not delay the resolution of this matter.”34 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Tax Court observed that the taxpayer, who was 
represented by counsel, had already raised the statute of limitations  issue 
and in fact had made it a “cornerstone of his case.”35 As such, the Tax 
Court reasoned that the USVI’s participation would only “introduce 
redundancy into the proceedings,” 36 and if allowed to intervene, its 
participation “could result in trial complications as well as delay the 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Id. at 466. Under intervention of right, the court “must permit” intervention by any party 
that “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and 
is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s 
ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 24(a)(2). Under permissive intervention, the court “may permit” intervention by a 
governmental officer or agency if the claim is based on a statute or regulation administered by the 
officer or agency. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2). The USVI indicated that, if allowed to intervene, it 
would file a motion for summary judgment asserting the IRS was time barred under I.R.C. § 6501, 
which was also the foundation of the taxpayer’s argument. Appleton I, 135 T.C. at 466. 
 30. Appleton I, 135 T.C. at 471. 
 31. Id. at 467–68. 
 32. Id. at 468. 
 33. Id. at 466–67. 
 34. Id. at 469 (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. at 470. 
 36. Id.  
6
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resolution of the [statute of limitations] issue.”37 In lieu of intervention, 
the Tax Court granted the USVI the right to file an amicus brief to 
advance its interest in the outcome of the proceeding.38 
B.  The Third and Eighth Circuits 
On appeal, the Third Circuit in Appleton v. Commissioner (Appleton 
II)39—an unpublished decision—held that the Tax Court abused its 
discretion by denying the USVI’s motion because it applied the incorrect 
standard when considering permissive intervention under FRCP 
24(b)(2).40 Since the Third Circuit granted the USVI permissive 
intervention, the appellate court did not reach the issue of intervention of 
right under FRCP 24(a)(2).41  
In response to Appleton II, the IRS published an Action on Decision 
stating that it would “not follow the Third Circuit’s nonprecedential 
opinion in Appleton [II] in any pending or future litigation.”42 Then the 
Eighth Circuit, in Coffey v. Commissioner,43 followed the Third Circuit 
in holding that the Tax Court applied the incorrect legal standard to the 
USVI’s motion for permissive intervention.44 Like the Third Circuit, the 
Eighth Circuit did not reach the issue of intervention of right under FRCP 
24(a)(2).45  
C.  The Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit, in McHenry v. Commissioner,46 declined to follow 
the Third and Eighth Circuits and instead sided with the Tax Court.47 In 
                                                                                                                     
 37. Id. at 470–71. Through its participation in the proceeding, the USVI would “have the 
right to introduce documentary evidence, call its own witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses of 
the other parties.” Id. at 470.  
 38. Id. at 471. 
 39. 430 F. Appx. 135 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 40. Id. at 136, 138. The Third Circuit took issue with the Tax Court’s conclusion that the 
USVI had not demonstrated that its participation was “necessary,” nor shown that its intervention 
“will not delay” the resolution of this matter. Id. at 136, 137–38. The Court reasoned that the 
above standard was improper because FRCP 24(b) requires the court to consider “whether this 
intervention will cause ‘undue delay,’ or ‘prejudice the adjudication of the original parties 
rights.’” Id. at 138 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3)). 
 41. Id. at 137. 
 42. IRS, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, IRB No. 2011–47, ACTION ON DECISION (Nov. 21, 
2011). 
 43. 663 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 44. Id. at 951. “As the Third Circuit said, whether the proposed intervenor’s participation 
is ‘necessary to advocate for an unaddressed issue’ is not the correct standard.” Id. (quoting 
Appleton II, 430 F. Appx. at 138). 
 45. See id. at 952 n.3. 
 46. 677 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 47. Id. at 216. In McHenry, the IRS issued the taxpayer notices of deficiency for failing to 
file returns with the IRS based on the agency’s determination that the taxpayer was not a bona 
7
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contrast to the Third and Eighth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit reached the 
issue of intervention of right and, in affirming the denial of intervention, 
noted its “great” deference to the Tax Court:  
Because Tax Court Rule 1(b) gives the Tax Court broad 
discretion in deciding whether and to what extent to follow 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governing intervention 
and because Civil Rule 24 itself confers broad discretion on 
a trial court, we give great deference to a Tax Court’s 
decision to deny intervention, reviewing only for a clear 
abuse of discretion.48  
The Fourth Circuit noted the USVI’s uphill battle for intervention 
under FRCP 24(a)(2), acknowledging that the Tax Court has never 
authorized a non-taxpayer third party to intervene as of right in a tax 
deficiency proceeding.49 The court explained that the USVI would have 
to “demonstrate the error in the Tax Court’s observation that a non-
taxpayer, governmental entity may never have a ‘right’ to intervene in a 
tax deficiency proceeding in the Tax Court.”50 Furthermore, the Fourth 
Circuit stated that it was not “authorized to mandate Tax Court procedure 
to govern intervention of right even if [the appellate courts] thought it 
would be useful” as that power “is left exclusively to the Tax Court” 
pursuant to I.R.C. § 7453.51 
                                                                                                                     
fide resident of the USVI pursuant to I.R.C. § 932. Id. at 216–17. The taxpayer challenged the 
notices in the Tax Court and the USVI moved to intervene, arguing for intervention of right under 
FRCP 24(a)(2) and permissive intervention under 24(b)(2). Id. at 217. 
 48. Id. at 216. As already noted, Tax Court Rule 1(b) provides “the Court or the Judge 
before whom the matter is pending may prescribe the procedure, giving particular weight to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that they are suitably adaptable to govern the matter 
at hand.” TAX CT. R. 1(b) (emphasis added).  
 49. Id. at 226. The Tax Court has authorized a spouse of a taxpayer to intervene as a matter 
of right under FRCP 24(a)(1), which provides that a court must grant intervention to a party “who 
is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(1); see, e.g., 
Christie v. Comm’r, No. 24515-12S, 2014 WL 1243973, at *1 (T.C. Mar. 26, 2014) (“Section 
6015(e)(4) confers on a nonelecting spouse an unconditional statutory right to intervene within 
the meaning of rule 24(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 50. McHenry, 677 F.3d at 226. Though the USVI did not challenge the Tax Court’s use of 
discretion in denying intervention under FRCP 24(a)(2), the court noted that if it had “attempted 
to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, it would be faced with the Tax Court’s own perception of 
its limited jurisdiction” under I.R.C. § 6213(a). Id.; see also Cincinnati Transit Inc. v. Comm’r, 
55 T.C. 879, 882 (1971), aff’d, 455 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972) (“A perusal of the various sections 
of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with appeals to the Tax Court and procedures in the Tax 
Court make it very clear that the provisions of the Code contemplate that redetermination of 
deficiencies in a particular case are to be made only upon a petition filed by the taxpayer whose 
taxes are involved or his duly authorized representative . . . .”). 
 51. McHenry, 677 F.3d at 226; I.R.C. § 7453 (2012) (stating “the proceedings of the Tax 
Court and its divisions shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure 
(other than rules of evidence) as the Tax Court may prescribe”). Even assuming FRCP 24(a)(2) 
8
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D.  The Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit—unlike the other circuits—did not reach the 
issue of permissive intervention under FRCP 24(b)(2) and instead 
decided that FRCP 24(a)(2) does apply in Tax Court proceedings.52 In 
reversing the Tax Court, the Eleventh Circuit in Huff applied the de novo 
standard of review to the Tax Court’s denial of intervention of right.53 To 
decide if the USVI could intervene under FRCP 24(a)(2), the Huff Court 
considered the following: (1) whether the USVI had any “interests in the 
Tax Court proceedings”; (2) whether those “interests would be practically 
affected by the Virgin Islands’ exclusion”; and (3) whether the taxpayers 
would “adequately represent[]” the USVI’s interests.54 
The Huff court determined that the USVI had two interests in the Tax 
Court proceeding. First, it found that the USVI had an “interest[] in the 
disputed tax revenue” at issue in the deficiency proceeding given the 
“practical implications for the Virgin Island’s taxation of the same 
individuals.”55 Second, the court found that the USVI also had a 
“sovereign interest” in the Tax Court proceeding because “the IRS’s 
ability to issue deficiency notices to Virgin Islands taxpayers beyond 
§ 6501’s three-year period implicates the Virgin Islands’ interest in 
preserving the integrity of its tax system.”56 The court reasoned that 
“[t]his type of sovereign interest is precisely the type of legally 
protectable interest that has long formed the basis for intervention under 
Rule 24(a)(2).”57 
The Eleventh Circuit then addressed whether these interests would be 
impaired by a denial of intervention, and if so, whether the original parties 
to the proceeding would adequately represent the USVI’s interests.58 The 
court noted that FRCP 24(a)(2) merely requires a showing “that the 
would-be intervener be practically disadvantaged by his exclusion from 
the proceedings.”59 The court concluded that the USVI met this low bar 
because an adverse ruling “will affect the Virgin Islands’ ability to 
                                                                                                                     
applied to the proceeding, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court’s conclusion “that the 
Virgin Islands cannot demonstrate that resolution of [the taxpayer’s] statute of limitations defense 
will impede the Virgin Islands’ ability to protect its interests.” McHenry, 677 F.3d at 226–27. The 
McHenry court found the outcome of the case would not impede the USVI’s ability to administer 
its own tax laws, and its views on the proper application of the I.R.C. could be expressed in an 
amicus brief as permitted by the Tax Court. Id. at 227. 
 52. Huff v. Comm’r, 743 F.3d 790, 801–02 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 53. Id. at 795. 
 54. Id. at 796. 
 55. Id. at 798–99. 
 56. Id. at 799. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 800. 
 59. Id. 
9
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independently administer its tax system and will impact its claim to the 
tax revenue it received from these Taxpayers.”60 Ultimately, the circuit 
court held that “the Taxpayers’ pecuniary interest is qualitatively 
different from the Virgin Islands’ sovereign interests in the 
administration of its tax system,” and thus the USVI’s interests in the 
proceedings were not adequately represented in the proceeding.61  
Going further than its sister circuits, the Huff court held that FRCP 
24(a)(2) does apply in Tax Court proceedings.62 While the Eleventh 
Circuit acknowledged that the Tax Court Rules do not provide rules for 
intervention of right, the court noted that Rule 1(b) permits the 
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when necessary and 
also that Rule 1(d) mandates that “[t]he Court’s Rules shall be construed 
to secure the just . . . determination of every case.”63 The Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that “[g]iven the thrust of the Tax Court Rules,” the “novelty 
[of applying FRCP 24(a)(2) to a Tax Court proceeding fails as] a 
sufficient justification to deny the Virgin Islands the benefit of Rule 
24(a)(2).”64 
III.  ANALYSIS OF HUFF 
The Huff court made two errors. First, by ignoring I.R.C. § 7453 and 
glossing over Tax Court Rule 1(b), Huff applied the wrong standard of 
review to the Tax Court’s discretionary decision to not apply FRCP 
24(a)(2) in its own proceeding. Second, even under a de novo standard of 
review, the appellate court should not have allowed the USVI to intervene 
in a limited Tax Court deficiency proceeding in order to wage its private 
war against the IRS.  
A.  The Huff Court Applied the Wrong Standard of Review 
Unlike the Third and Eighth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit allowed the 
USVI to intervene in a Tax Court proceeding under intervention of right 
rather than permissive intervention.65 Yet, when it reversed the Tax 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 800–01. The court bolstered its inadequate-representation finding by pointing to 
the different “capabilities” of the taxpayers due to their lack of “the same institutional knowledge 
of the interrelationship between the United States and Virgin Islands tax systems . . . [and] access 
to the same information regarding the consequences of the IRS’s statute-of-limitations position.” 
Id. at 800. 
 62. Id. at 801. 
 63. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TAX CT. R. 1(d)). Tax Court Rule 1(d) in its entirety 
reads, “The Court’s Rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every case.” TAX CT. R. 1(d) (emphasis added).  
 64. Huff, 743 F.3d at 801. 
 65. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
10
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Court’s denial of intervention of right, the Huff court erred by applying 
the de novo standard of review.66 This de novo standard is at odds with 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision to review the Tax Court’s denial of 
intervention for an abuse of discretion in McHenry.67 While the Huff court 
was correct that the Eleventh Circuit “review[s] a trial court’s denial of 
intervention of right de novo,”68 its error in choosing the de novo review 
standard stems from the interplay of the following elements: (1) the Tax 
Court’s decision in Appleton I to “reserve[] the question of whether Rule 
24(a)(2) applies in Tax Court in the first place”;69 (2) the Tax Court’s 
discretion to implement its own procedure pursuant to Tax Court Rule 
1(b) and I.R.C. § 7453; and (3) the general effect of I.R.C. § 7482 on 
appellate review of Tax Court rulings. 
                                                                                                                     
 66. See Huff, 743 F.3d at 795.  
 67. In 1988, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood settled a circuit split over the 
correct standard of review regarding a “substantial justification” issue. 487 U.S. 552, 557–63 
(1988). The Pierce Court articulated the problem of choosing the proper standard of review as 
follows: 
For some few trial court determinations, the question of what is the standard of 
appellate review is answered by relatively explicit statutory command. For most 
others, the answer is provided by a long history of appellate practice. But when, 
as here, the trial court determination is one for which neither a clear statutory 
prescription nor a historical tradition exists, it is uncommonly difficult to derive 
from the pattern of appellate review of other questions an analytical framework 
that will yield the correct answer. 
Id. at 558 (citations omitted). As framed by Professor Martha Davis, the Court developed the 
following “‘significant relevant factors’ to weigh in favor of or against deferential review”:  
(1) implicit statutory direction, even when language does not compel deference 
or is not perfectly clear; (2) provision for deferential review in analogous 
determinations under the statute; (3) the judicial actor who, as a “matter of the 
sound administration of justice,” is “better positioned than another to decide the 
issue”; (4) whether it is impracticable to formulate a rule of decision for the issue, 
because the problem is multifarious, novel, fleeting, and resists generalization 
for now; and (5) the substantial consequences and liability of an erroneous 
determination. 
Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 65 (2000) (footnotes omitted) (citing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559–63). 
Several circuit courts have applied Pierce when reviewing Tax Court proceedings. E.g., Huffman 
v. Comm’r, 978 F.2d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Because of the fact-bound nature of the inquiry, 
a deferential abuse of discretion review of the Tax Court’s finding of substantial justification is 
appropriate.”); Heasley v. Comm’r, 967 F.2d 116, 120 (5th Cir. 1992); William L. Comer Family 
Equity Pure Trust v. Comm’r, 958 F.2d 136, 139 (6th Cir. 1992); Cassuto v. Comm’r, 936 F.2d 
736, 740 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 68. Huff, 743 F.3d at 795.  
 69. Id. at 801 (citing Appleton v. Comm’r (Appleton I), 135 T.C. 461, 466–67 (2010)).  
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1.  The Tax Court Has Never Applied FRCP 24(a)(2) 
The Tax Court in Appleton I explicitly stated that it “do[es] not decide 
herein whether [FRCP] 24(a)(2) applies” and that “[a] review of th[e Tax] 
Court’s jurisprudence reveals that the Court has never recognized 
intervention of a third party as a matter of right.”70 Indeed, the Tax 
Court’s findings in Appleton I that the USVI did not satisfy the elements 
of FRCP 24(a)(2) allowed the Tax Court to sidestep the decision of 
whether FRCP 24(a)(2) applied in that case, if at all in Tax Court 
proceedings.71 The Huff court, having harbored no such reservations, held 
that the rule may be applied in the Tax Court.72 
Moreover, as stated above, the Tax Court has never applied FRCP 
24(a)(2) in one of its proceedings. This choice makes clear why the 
Eleventh Circuit erred in choosing the de novo standard of review. As 
shown below, Congress has granted the Tax Court broad power to choose 
its own procedure.  
2.  The Tax Court Has a Statutorily Granted Power to Choose Its Own 
Procedures 
Generally, I.R.C. § 7453 provides that “the proceedings of the Tax 
Court and its divisions shall be conducted in accordance with such rules 
of practice and procedure . . . as the Tax Court may prescribe.”73 And in 
cases where there is no Tax Court Rule on point, Rule 1(b) grants the Tax 
Court the power to prescribe its own procedural rules “in any instance 
there is no applicable rule of procedure.”74 Specifically, Rule 1(b) states 
that where no rule of procedures applies, “the Court or Judge before 
whom the matter is pending may prescribe the procedure, giving 
particular weight to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that 
they are suitably adaptable to govern the matter at hand.”75 Taken 
together, I.R.C. § 7453 and Rule 1(b) grant the Tax Court the power to 
permit or deny intervention of right. 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Appleton I, 135 T.C. at 466–67. The Tax Court has applied FRCP 24(a)(1) where 
“Section 6015(e)(4) confers on a nonelecting spouse an unconditional statutory right to intervene 
within the meaning of rule 24(a)(1).” Christie v. Comm’r, No. 24515-12S, 2014 WL 1243973, at 
*1 (T.C. Mar. 26, 2014); Fain v. Comm’r, 129 T.C. 89, 90 (2007). 
 71. Appleton I, 135 T.C. at 466 (“Because we find that movant has not satisfied the 
requirements of [FRCP] 24(a)(2), we need not and do not decide herein whether [FRCP] 24(a)(2) 
applies to proceedings in this Court.”). 
 72. Huff, 743 F.3d at 801. 
 73. I.R.C. § 7453 (2012). 
 74. TAX CT. R. 1(b). 
 75. Id. (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit discussed Rule 1(b) only once prior to 
Huff—in an unpublished opinion—and as in Huff, it did not decide to grant any deference pursuant 
to Rule 1(b) to the Tax Court when reviewing its application of the Civil Rule in that case. See 
Langille v. Comm’r, 447 F. App’x 130, 135 (11th Cir. 2011).  
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In reviewing the Tax Court’s decision not to apply FRCP 24(a)(2), the 
Huff court did not explore the interaction of Tax Court Rule 1(b) and 
I.R.C. § 7453 with the Eleventh Circuit’s general standard of review for 
a district court’s denial of an FRCP 24(a)(2) motion.76 Instead, Huff 
interpreted Rule 1(b) not as a limit on its standard of review but as a grant 
of discretion to the appellate court to apply a procedural rule that the Tax 
Court had never applied in any proceeding.77  
In stark contrast, the Fourth Circuit in McHenry struck squarely on the 
implications of Tax Court Rule 1(b) and I.R.C. § 7453 on the proper 
standard of review. The McHenry court stated that Rule 1(b) “grants the 
Tax Court broad discretion to borrow procedures from the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.”78 Accordingly, a challenger would have to 
“demonstrate an abuse of discretion” and this would require showing that 
the Tax Court—in having never allowed a third party to intervene as a 
matter of right under FRCP 24(a)(2)—erred in its “own perception of its 
limited jurisdiction.”79 Regarding I.R.C. § 7453’s impact, the Fourth 
Circuit—in further contrast to the Huff court—noted its lack of authority 
to impose FRCP 24(a)(2) in a proceeding where the Tax Court had failed 
to do so.80 
3.  Under I.R.C. § 7482 the Abuse of Discretion Standard Is 
Proper for Reviewing Tax Court Procedural Decisions 
No case discusses how I.R.C. § 7482 affects this standard of review 
analysis. I.R.C. § 7482 states that “[t]he United States Courts of 
Appeals . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of 
the Tax Court . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions 
of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.”81 Taking I.R.C. 
§ 7482 at face value, the standards for reviewing Tax Court decisions 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Instead, the court plainly stated “[w]e review a trial court’s denial of intervention of 
right de novo” and then moved on to the merits of the case. Huff, 743 F.3d at 795. 
 77. See id. at 801. 
 78. McHenry v. Comm’r, 677 F.3d 214, 218 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 226. 
 80. See id. (“[W]e would not, in any event, be authorized to mandate Tax Court procedure 
to govern intervention of right even if we thought it would be useful. That is left exclusively to 
the Tax Court.” (citing I.R.C. § 7453)).  
 81. I.R.C. § 7482(a) (2012). The fact that I.R.C. § 7482 is labeled merely “Jurisdiction” 
does not narrow the circuit courts of appeals’ review of Tax Court decisions. Lederman, supra 
note 3, at 1867 n.160 (“It is odd that subsection (a) [of § 7482] is merely labeled ‘Jurisdiction,’ 
given that subsection (a)(1) refers to the ‘manner’ and ‘extent’ of review, not just the exclusivity 
of appellate court jurisdiction. It appears to be a carryover from the 1926 statute, which included 
in the ‘Jurisdiction’ section both the grant of appellate jurisdiction and the power of the appellate 
courts to affirm or reverse if the Board’s decision was not in accordance with the law.”). 
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would be the same as those for reviewing decisions of district courts.82 
However, courts have yet to discuss the effects of the discretion granted 
by Rule 1(b) and I.R.C. § 7453 on I.R.C. § 7482’s general rule.  
Given the discretion the Tax Court enjoys under § 7453, a de novo 
standard of review is not proper when reviewing a Tax Court’s 
interpretation and application of a procedural rule. I.R.C. § 7453 states 
that the Tax Court “may prescribe” its own rules of practice and 
procedure in its proceedings.83 Similarly, FRCP 24(b)(2) states that a 
court “may permit”84 intervention in certain situations; based on this 
permissive language, an appellate court generally reviews a trial court’s 
application of this rule for an abuse of discretion. 85 By analogy, an 
appellate court should similarly review the Tax Court’s application of a 
procedural rule for an abuse of discretion based on I.R.C. § 7453’s 
authorization that the Tax Court “may prescribe” its rules of procedure.  
I.R.C. § 7482 further supports this analogy because its plain language 
requires appellate courts to review Tax Court decisions in the same 
manner as district court decisions.86 Taking I.R.C. §§ 7482 and 7453 
together, appellate courts should review the Tax Court’s procedural 
rulings (made discretionary by I.R.C. § 7453) under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review, the same standard applied to discretionary 
district court decisions (as required by I.R.C. § 7482).87 Accordingly, the 
Huff court applied an incorrect standard of review to the Tax Court’s 
denial of the USVI’s motion to intervene.  
                                                                                                                     
 82. Indeed, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits appear to have taken this approach and 
simply used the same standards of review for district court decisions when deciding Tax Court 
Rule 1(b) decisions. See Wronke v. Comm’r, 17 F. App’x 482, 485 (7th Cir. 2001) (utilizing the 
abuse of discretion standard when applying FRCP 60(b) to a Tax Court proceeding as the standard 
under which the Seventh Circuit reviews such FRCP 60(b) motions from district courts); Huff, 
743 F.3d at 795.  
 83. I.R.C. § 7453 (emphasis added). 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 85. In particular, the Eleventh Circuit reviews “a denial of permissive intervention for a 
clear abuse of discretion.” Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008).  
 86. See Kelley v. Comm’r, 45 F.3d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Ninth Circuit 
“review[s] decisions of the Tax Court on the same basis as decisions in civil bench trials in United 
States District Court. Thus, the Tax Court’s . . . discretionary rulings are examined for an abuse 
of discretion” (citations omitted)). 
 87. See Kalo v. Comm’r, 149 F.3d 1183 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “review[s] the Tax Court’s interpretation and application of its own 
procedural rules for an abuse of discretion”); Comm’r v. Long’s Estate, 304 F.2d 136, 144 (9th 
Cir. 1962); Comm’r v. Erie Forge Co., 167 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1948) (“The Tax Court is 
authorized to determine whether its rules are complied with and where its decision of such 
questions is not shown to be clearly wrong it should not be disturbed.”); Comm’r v. Kerbaugh, 74 
F.2d 749, 750 (1st Cir. 1935) (per curiam) (“The Board of Tax Appeals is authorized to establish 
its own rules of procedure and to determine whether those rules are complied with. Where their 
decision of such a question is not shown to be clearly wrong, it should not be disturbed.”). 
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B.  The Huff Court Should Not Have Allowed the Virgin 
Islands to Intervene 
Even assuming the de novo standard was appropriate, Huff erred in 
finding that the USVI had met FRCP 24(a)(2)’s requirements. In 
reversing the Tax Court’s denial of intervention as of right, the court 
began its analysis by finding that the USVI had two legally protectable 
interests. First, the Huff court found that the USVI had an interest in the 
“disputed tax revenue” and that its exclusion from the Tax Court 
proceeding would “impact its claim” to this revenue.88 In its analysis, the 
court determined the three possible scenarios that would result from an 
adverse ruling for the taxpayer, and therefore also for the USVI:  
[1] the IRS may ask the Virgin Islands to transfer over the 
portion of taxes that should have been paid to the United 
States; [2] the Virgin Islands may choose to voluntarily 
refund the “overpaid” taxes as a matter of fairness; or [3] the 
Virgin Islands may be forced to accept that the Taxpayers 
paid taxes twice on the same income.89 
Yet, based on these scenarios, there is no real impact on the USVI’s claim 
to the disputed tax revenue: the IRS cannot compel the USVI to transfer 
the taxes, and nothing requires the USVI to relinquish them, leaving only 
the final possibility of the USVI’s guilty conscience from its citizens 
being taxed twice—a result of the taxpayer’s own misapplication of the 
I.R.C. 
The court also found that the USVI had a “sovereign interest” in the 
proceeding in “preserving the integrity of its tax system.”90 Indeed, the 
USVI views this case as “one battle in a long-running, multi-front war 
being waged by the Internal Revenue Service.”91 However, as the Fourth 
Circuit in McHenry correctly observed, the USVI has other viable 
options: 
No matter what the outcome of the tax deficiency case, the 
Virgin Islands will retain the same authority to administer its 
[tax laws], and any views it has on the IRS’s interpretation 
of the U.S. Tax Code can easily be expressed in an amicus 
brief, which the Tax Court has indicated it will allow, or in 
some other forum more suited to such policy arguments.92  
                                                                                                                     
 88. Huff v. Comm’r, 743 F.3d 799–800 (2014). 
 89. Id. at 798 (emphasis added). 
 90. Id. at 799. 
 91. Brief for Appellant at 1, Huff, 743 F.3d 790 (Nos. 11-10608, 11-10617, 11-10618), 2011 
WL 2782944. 
 92. McHenry v. Comm’r, 677 F.3d 214, 227 (2012). 
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The USVI wrongly seeks to wage this war in a limited deficiency 
proceeding and “[u]ndoubtedly, if allowed to intervene, the Virgin 
Islands would transform the deficiency case into some proceeding far 
larger, far more complex, and far more protracted.”93  
Finally, the court found that the USVI’s interests were not adequately 
represented by the original parties to the proceeding due to the 
“Taxpayers’ different interests and capabilities.”94 Regarding their 
interests, while the court acknowledged that the taxpayers and the USVI 
have taken the same position for litigation, the court found that the 
“Taxpayers’ pecuniary interest is qualitatively different from the Virgin 
Islands’ sovereign interests in the administration of its tax system.”95 
Despite these purported differences of interest, the USVI should not be 
allowed to intervene in the proceeding because these interests are not the 
type of legally protectable interests required for intervention of right, as 
discussed above and also in Appleton I and McHenry.96  
Turning to capabilities, the Huff court reasoned that the USVI would 
be inadequately represented by the taxpayers because they lacked the 
“same institutional knowledge of the interrelationship between the 
United States and Virgin Islands tax systems.”97 Assuming arguendo that 
the taxpayers lacked the indicated understanding, this knowledge is 
irrelevant to the disposition of the underlying case in which the USVI 
seeks to intervene. These rulings turn only on the proper application of 
provisions of the I.R.C., i.e., whether the statute of limitations applies 
under I.R.C. § 6501, and if not, whether the taxpayers were bona fide 
residents pursuant to I.R.C. § 932. Indeed, if the taxpayers prevail on 
either issue, the USVI also prevails and its tax system is thereby 
preserved. The court further reasoned that the taxpayers had different 
capabilities from the USVI because they lacked “access to the same 
information regarding the consequences of the IRS’s statute-of-
limitations position.”98 Yet, it is unclear what consequences the court had 
in mind. Since the taxpayers were represented by counsel in the 
litigation,99 they certainly had access to the information and expertise 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Id. The Tax Court reasoned that, were the USVI allowed to intervene, its participation 
“could result in trial complications as well as delay the resolution of the [statute of limitations] 
issue.” Appleton v. Comm’r (Appleton I), 135 T.C. 461, 470 (2010). Through its participation in 
the proceeding, the USVI would “have the right to introduce documentary evidence, call its own 
witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses of the other parties.” Id. 
 94. Huff, 743 F.3d at 800. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See supra notes 31–32, 50 and accompanying text. 
 97. Huff, 743 F.3d at 800. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Petitioner Huff was represented by the international law firm of Sharp Partners P.A., 
which specializes in international tax planning and controversies. See Huff v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 
258, 259 (2012); SHARP PARTNERS P.A.: INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW, http://www.sharptaxlaw.com 
(last visited July 1, 2015). 
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needed to address the proper interpretation and application of I.R.C. 
§§ 6501 and 932.  
CONCLUSION 
Assuming that the de novo standard of review to the Tax Court’s 
denial of the USVI’s motion to intervene was proper, the Huff court erred 
in finding that the USVI had an interest in the proceeding, that this 
interest was impaired, and finally, that the interest would not be 
adequately represented by the taxpayer.  
On the other hand, whether the Eleventh Circuit erred in applying the 
de novo review standard depends on the interplay of three provisions. 
I.R.C. § 7453 grants the Tax Court the power to prescribe its own 
procedure, and Tax Court Rule 1(b) grants the Tax Court the discretion 
to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, I.R.C. § 7482 
mandates that the courts of appeals review tax court decisions in the same 
manner and to the same extent as district court decisions. Because 
appellate courts generally review discretionary decisions of district courts 
for an abuse of discretion, the Huff court erred in applying the de novo 
standard given the Tax Court’s statutorily granted discretion to apply—
or not apply—the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Going forward, 
appellate courts should review all procedural decisions made by the Tax 
Court for an abuse of the discretion based on I.R.C. §§ 7453, 7482, and 
Tax Court Rule 1(b).  
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